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INTRODUCTION
From the Great Lakes to pristine northern streams, Wisconsin boasts a 
plentiful and valuable array of water resources. Yet water stress analyses show 
that this natural capital is deeply threatened in a variety of ways. The pressure 
* Director, Water Law and Policy Initiative, Marquette University Law School. 
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results primarily from human activity, ranging from general overuse to 
colonization by anthropogenically introduced non-native species. Some of the 
greatest water quality problems, however, are caused by land use practices that 
lead to polluted runoff from farm fields and urban settings. The onset of climate 
change has the potential to further exacerbate all of this. These issues, coupled 
with the failure of existing law to effectively address them, confront regulators 
and policy makers with difficult and novel questions. As a result, the next 
century will demand innovative approaches to preserve the quality and quantity 
of Wisconsin’s water resources for both public and private purposes. 
The opening question is basic: Who bears responsibility to address these 
emerging problems? As an initial matter, under both statutory and common 
law, it is the state. Federal and state environmental laws vest it with that 
authority, to the extent of their coverage. The public trust doctrine, long 
established in our courts, likewise charges the state with protecting water 
resources for current and future generations of Wisconsin citizens to use for 
navigation, fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty. But the scope of the 
environmental laws is limited, and recent developments in the Wisconsin 
Legislature and court system have further curtailed the state’s power. For 
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified that the public trust doctrine 
does not apply to land use practices, thereby limiting its usefulness as a water 
quality protection tool.1
One approach to this dilemma is to recognize that federal and state 
government regulators, acting alone under current law, can no longer fully 
protect water quality. New laws that fill the gap seem unlikely, meaning that 
responsible engagement by local governments and private entities will be 
essential.
Professor Henry Smith has already proposed that the law should treat water 
much like intellectual property rights—as a “semicommons.”2 Smith argues 
that exclusionary governance regimes are a poor fit for “fluid resources” and 
instead calls for hybrid systems that combine private and common elements of 
property.3 Smith’s theory—at least as he has expressed it to date—relates 
primarily to private rights to use water under various legal systems currently in 
place. But a broader conceptualization is also useful. If private entities have a 
right to use water, they should also share a corresponding responsibility to 
maintain the resource. Water quality is important for public and private uses 
alike. This article will explore whether the semicommons approach could be 
expanded to justify a more inclusive approach to responsibility for water quality 
1. Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. DNR, 833 N.W.2d 800, 820–21 (Wis. 2013). 
2. See infra Section III.A. 
3. See infra Section III.A. 
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concerns in addition to private use rights. Innovative proposals along those 
lines could include involvement by local governments, including cities and 
counties; voluntary programs; and even private sector involvement in water 
quality preservation through increased grant or cost-sharing efforts, public 
educational campaigns, limited public-private partnerships, and other 
mechanisms. To be sure, this private role must come with safeguards that 
protect the resource and simultaneously encourage broad participation. 
I. ARRAY OF WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES FACING WISCONSIN
Wisconsin’s water resources have been negatively affected by “nonpoint” 
source pollution, invasion by non-native species, and groundwater overuse and 
depletion, among other threats.4 Climate change will further affect our 
resources in unexpected ways. 
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Perhaps the greatest threat to Wisconsin water quality comes from nonpoint 
source pollution, meaning that it does not originate from traditional “end-of- 
pipe” sources. Rather, it emanates from diffuse sources washed by 
precipitation over the land into surface waters.5 Examples include urban runoff 
from paved areas such as roads and parking lots containing oil and grease, 
sediment from poorly managed construction sites, and runoff containing excess 
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricultural lands as well as 
bacteria and nutrients from livestock operations.6 Contributing agricultural 
practices may include poorly located or managed animal feeding operations, 
overgrazing, plowing errors, and improper application of pesticides, fertilizer, 
4. The World Resources Institute’s popular “Aqueduct” project measures and maps water risks 
from the global to the local scales. See Aqueduct Measuring and Mapping Water Risk, WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/aqueduct [https://perma.cc/R9L6- 
WUCE] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). The project results showed most of Wisconsin under either 
“extremely high risk” or “high risk” for water quality impacts. Id.
5. See Thomas C. Brown & Pamela Froemke, Nationwide Assessment of Nonpoint Source 
Threats to Water Quality, 62 BIOSCIENCE 136, 136 (2012). 
6. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What is Nonpoint Source?, EPA.GOV
https://www.epa.gov/nps/what-nonpoint-source [https://perma.cc/VC46-Z6X3] (last updated May 2, 
2017); see also Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/nonpoint/ [https://perma.cc/S5EU-82BA] (last updated Jan. 5, 2017). In 1987, 
as the federal government tried to strengthen federal efforts to regulate nonpoint source pollution (see 
Section II.A, infra), EPA issued guidance defining nonpoint source pollution as “caused by diffuse 
sources that are not regulated as point sources and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural 
and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc. In practical terms, nonpoint source 
pollution does not result from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe) but 
generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.” U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987). 
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and irrigation water.7
The impacts of nonpoint source pollution on water quality can be severe. 
State-level data compiled by United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) shows that agricultural nonpoint source pollution is the leading source 
of water quality impacts on rivers and streams, the third-largest source of such 
impacts on lakes, the second-largest source of wetland impairment, and a 
frequent contributor to groundwater contamination.8 Excess nutrients from 
agricultural runoff can cause increased nitrogen and phosphorus levels in 
surface waters, resulting in algal blooms and lower dissolved oxygen levels for 
aquatic life.9
At the state level, nonpoint pollution is “a leading cause of water quality 
problems in Wisconsin.”10 It is a source of impairment to about 58% of 
impaired waters listed under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA).11
Even worse, excess agricultural runoff containing “[m]anure, fertilizers, 
pesticides, herbicides and pharmaceuticals may pollute groundwater.”12 This 
problem is especially severe in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin, where at least 
one-third of wells are unsafe for use as a drinking water source, partially due to 
manure overspreading in agricultural settings.13
B. Non-Native Species 
Wisconsin waters—and especially the Great Lakes—are also threatened 
with a hostile takeover by non-native (sometimes called “invasive”) species. 
Defining exactly what that means can be difficult. By some definitions, an 
“invasive species” is any non-native species.14 But a more nuanced definition 
7. See generally EPA, supra note 6. 
8. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nonpoint Source: Agriculture, EPA.GOV
https://www.epa.gov/nps/nonpoint-source-agriculture [https://perma.cc/2JJE-DZWD] (last updated 
Aug. 18, 2017); Robin K. Craig and Anna M. Roberts, When Will Governments Regulate Nonpoint 
Source Pollution? A Comparative Perspective, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3, 37 (2015). 
9. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURAL RUNOFF,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Nonpoint/AgEnviromentalImpact.html [https://perma.cc/L7YT-K3GF].
10. Wis. DNR, supra note 6. 
11. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WISCONSIN’S NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT PLAN FFY 2016–2020, 24 (2015). 
12. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Runoff, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Nonpoint/AgEnviromentalImpact.html [https://perma.cc/DEK5-QSV4] (last 
updated May 26, 2015). 
13. Lee Bergquist, One-Third of Wells in Kewaunee County Unsafe for Drinking Water,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Dec. 21, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/one- 
third-of-wells-in-kewaunee-county-unsafe-for-drinking-water-b99636500z1-363176361.html/ 
[https://perma.cc/58D9-Y4HL].
14. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Invasive Species, https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/invasive- 
species [https://perma.cc/AQ5M-JUE8] (last updated Aug. 14, 2017). 
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is increasingly appropriate—an “invasive species” is a non-native species 
“whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm 
or harm to human health.”15
The latter definition makes plain that not all non-native species are invasive. 
Most non-native species cause no economic or environmental harm; indeed, 
many are beneficial, including cattle, wheat, soybeans, and tulips.16
Nevertheless, under any definition, some “invasive” species certainly are a 
problem for the Great Lakes region. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration estimates that “[t]he Great Lakes ecosystem has been severely 
damaged by more than 180 invasive and non-native species.”17 The best- 
known invaders, such as the zebra mussel, quagga mussel, sea lamprey, and 
alewife, “degrad[e] habitat, out-compet[e] native species, and short-circuit[ ] 
food webs.”18 The impact on diverse industries including commercial and sport 
fishing, tourism, and even agriculture can be severe; recent estimates put the 
economic damages at “significantly over $100 million annually.”19
Moreover, such economic damage estimates do not fully value the 
nonmonetary damages involved in the displacement of native organisms or the 
destruction of ecosystems.20 Costs typically not considered include the impact 
on natural ecosystems, the extinction of native species, lost water-purification 
capability, aesthetic and recreational impacts, and weakened resistance to 
impacts of invasions by other species in the future.21 When damage to those 
15. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999). The Order was intended 
to “prevent the introduction of invasive species and provide for their control and to minimize the 
economic, ecological, and human health impacts that invasive species cause.” Id.
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1, INVASIVE SPECIES: CLEARER FOCUS
AND GREATER COMMITMENT NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE PROBLEM 8 (2002) 
(hereinafter GAO); see also NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, 2008-2012 NATIONAL INVASIVE
SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2008) (“Most nonnative species . . . are not harmful; and many are 
highly beneficial.”). 
17. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Invasive Species: Great Lakes Region,
http://www.regions.noaa.gov/great-lakes/index.php/great_lakes-restoration-initiative/invasive-
species/ [https://perma.cc/4DNJ-X9NG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). The Environmental Protection 
Agency estimates that this includes at least twenty-five species of invasive fish along with many 
invasive plants. U.S. EPA, supra note 14. 
18. NOAA, supra note 17. For an outstanding and detailed discussion of the history and impact 
of invasive species in the Great Lakes, see DAN EGAN, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT LAKES
1-150 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2017). 
19. Alex L. Rosaen et al., The Costs of Aquatic Invasive Species to Great Lakes States, THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY 1 (Mar. 5, 2012), 
https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/areas/greatlakes/ais-economic-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KSZ-KFVE]. 
20. GAO, supra note 16, at 13. “Most economic estimates do not consider all of the relevant 
effects of nonnative species or the future risks that they pose.” Id. at “Highlights ofGAO-03-1”.
21. Id. at 13, 23, 55; John D. Rothlisberger et al., Ship-Borne Nonindigenous Species Diminish 
Great Lakes Ecosystem Services, 15 ECOSYSTEMS 462, 462 (2012). 
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“ecosystem services” are considered, the economic toll on the Great Lakes may 
rise to $800 million annually.22
C. Groundwater Overuse and Depletion 
More than twenty percent of Wisconsin’s land area lies within the Great 
Lakes basin.23 Vast tracts of the state, therefore, do not have access to Great 
Lakes water and largely depend on groundwater for municipal and industrial 
supplies. As a matter of hydrogeology, groundwater pumping lowers water 
levels in connected bodies of water, sometimes other groundwater but more 
often streams and other surface waters.24 In some areas, groundwater overuse 
has led to significant consequences for those connected waters. This section 
discusses two examples: the Central Sands region of the state and the City of 
Waukesha. 
1. Central Sands 
In the United States, irrigated agriculture is sometimes thought to be mostly 
localized to the arid western states. Increasingly, this is untrue; “[i]rrigated 
agriculture has expanded greatly in the water-rich U.S. northern lake states 
during the past half century.”25 Such “supplemental” irrigation, while not 
necessary for crop survival, augments production and extends the growing 
season.26 However, this practice can create significant environmental 
challenges when groundwater is shallow and closely connected to local surface 
waters.27
Those tight connections between surface and ground waters are present in 
Wisconsin’s “central sands,” a region that encompasses about 1.75 million 
22. Rothlisberger, supra note 21. “Ecosystem services” are services provided by natural 
systems that were historically not valued in markets because of their nature as public goods. Laurie A. 
Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal Policy in Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets,
20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 385, 385 (2010). Increased recognition of their value has led to 
increasing calls to remedy this exclusion. See generally id. 
23. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources, Wisconsin’s Great Lakes,
https://www.dnr.wi.gov/topic/Greatlakes/learn.html [https://perma.cc/38BG-MG2Q] (last updated 
May 3, 2017). 
24. See, e.g., Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the 
Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 276 (2011) (“groundwater pumping . . . creates a 
‘cone of depression’” in the water table surrounding a well); Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: 
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 202 
(2008) (“[G]roundwater is often directly connected to surface water [and] pumping can seriously affect 
the amount of water that would otherwise remain in rivers, lakes, springs, and wetlands.”). 
25. George J. Kraft et al., Irrigation Effects in the Northern Lake States: Wisconsin Central 
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acres overlying a shallow glacial aquifer in parts of Adams, Marathon, 
Marquette, Portage, Shawano, Waupaca, Waushara, and Wood counties.28 In
many parts of the region, the aquifer lies only a few feet below the ground.29
The region contains over 800 miles of high-quality “trout streams”30 and over 
300 lakes, most of which are largely sourced from groundwater.31
As of 2010, over 2300 high capacity wells32 irrigate about 200,000 acres 
in the Central Sands region.33 The number of wells, and the acreage served, 
has grown significantly in recent decades.34 Meanwhile, surface water levels 
and stream discharges have been substantially lower, and some lakes and 
streams substantially disappear during dry seasons.35 The question, of course, 
is whether these two phenomena are connected. 
Recent studies conclusively show that they are. A well-researched 2012 
report found that “[i]rrigation stresses are sufficient to explain the previously 
rare or never before observed low-water conditions that have prevailed since 
2000 in the Wisconsin central sands.”36 Precipitation during the same period 
was at average or slightly below average levels, ruling out a drought as the 
likely cause of the lower levels.37 Over one-third of the base flow of some 
streams has been diverted due to groundwater pumping for agriculture.38 The
increased pumping activities cause a net “recharge reduction” sufficient to 
explain the drastic decreases in surface water levels.39
28. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, CENTRAL WISCONSIN SAND AND GRAVEL
AQUIFER: MANAGING WATER FOR MULTIPLE USES 1 (2013). 
29. Id.
30. “Trout streams” are generally defined to include streams that contain either a self- 
sustaining trout population, a trout population that may become self-sustaining, or a stream with habitat 
of sufficient quality to be stocked with trout to provide trout fishing. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § 
NR 820.12(2)–(4) (2017) (defining Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 trout streams). Wisconsin regulations 
direct the Department of Natural Resources to take into account the existence of such streams when 
considering and approving applications for new high capacity wells. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 
820.30(1) – (2) (2017). 
31. Wis. DNR, supra note 23, at 1. 
32. WIS. STAT. § 281.34(1)(b) (2015–2016) (A “high capacity well” is “a well . . . that, together 
with all other wells on the same property . . . has a capacity [to pump] more than 100,000 gallons per 
day.”); see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 820.12(11) (2017). 
33. GEORGE J. KRAFT & DAVID J. MECHENICH, Groundwater Pumping Effects on 
Groundwater Levels, Lake Levels, and Streamflows in the Wisconsin Central Sands, at iii (2010) 
(hereinafter Kraft (2010)). 
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Kraft (2012), supra note 25, at 316. 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. “Recharge reduction” means a decrease in the amount of water recharging groundwater 
levels and is often caused by changes in land use. See Hasan M. Hameed, et al., Impacts of Urban 
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2. Waukesha, Wisconsin, and the Great Lakes Compact 
The story of the water supply in Waukesha, Wisconsin is a textbook 
example of how overuse slowly degrades a resource. Over a century ago, 
Waukesha became known as “Spring City” for the quality of its spring water, 
known nationwide and even believed by some to have healing properties.40 As 
Waukesha grew, so did the demand on its wells. The eventual “mining” of the 
aquifer resulted in plummeting water levels and increasing contamination.41
Eventually, levels of radium—a carcinogen—in the deep aquifer came to far 
exceed federal drinking water standards.42 In 2003, city leaders signed a 
consent order with the State of Wisconsin and agreed to take “steps to achieve 
compliance with state radionuclide requirements” by December 2006.43 As to 
federal standards, the EPA ordered Waukesha to find a safe water supply by 
2018.44 These legal and practical circumstances resulted in Waukesha deciding 
to abandon its historic springs, and turn to the comparatively abundant 
freshwater resource about twenty miles to its east—the Great Lakes. 
Before it could tap the Great Lakes for its public water supply, however, 
Waukesha faced a legal hurdle—the Great Lakes Compact.45 The Compact, an 
agreement between Wisconsin and the other Great Lakes states, generally 
operates as a ban on new and increased diversions of Great Lakes water outside 
the Great Lakes basin, with certain limited exceptions.46 One of those 
exceptions allows communities located outside the basin, but within counties 
that straddle the basin line, to apply for a diversion.47 Waukesha is the first 
community to seek that exception,48 and its application drew close attention 
Growth on Groundwater Levels Using Remote Sensing- Case Study: Erbil City, Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq, 5 J. Nat. Sci. Research 72, 72 (2015). 
40. See generally Egan, supra note 18, at 256–64. 
41. See generally Christina L. Wabiszewski, Diversions from the Great Lakes: Out of the 
Watershed and in Contravention of the Compact, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 627, 646 (2016); see also Egan,
supra note 18, at 264. 
42. Wabiszewski, supra note 41, at 646–47. 
43. Id. at 647. 
44. Id.
45. The Great Lakes Compact has been enacted by the state legislatures of all member states, 
approved by Congress, and was signed by then-President George W. Bush on Oct. 3, 2008. See, e.g.,
WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2015–16); Wabiszewski, supra note 43, at 639. 
46. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (“All new or increased diversions are prohibited” with certain 
exceptions); see generally Amanda K. Beggs, “Death by a Thousand Straws”: Why and How the Great 
Lakes Council Should Define “Reasonable Water Supply Alternative” Within the Great Lakes 
Compact, 100 IOWA L. REV. 361, 365, 370–71 (2014). 
47. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c) (communities in counties that straddle the basin line may 
apply for an exception to the general prohibition on diversions, provided certain conditions are met). 
48. Wabiszewski, supra note 41, at 634. 
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locally and nationally.49 Under the Compact, Waukesha had to demonstrate, 
among other things, that it had “no reasonable water supply alternative,” that 
its need could not be reasonably avoided through the efficient use and 
conservation of existing water supplies, that the diversion would be limited to 
a “reasonable” amount of water, and that it would cause no significant impacts 
to the quantity or quality of the basin waters.50 All eight Great Lakes states had 
the opportunity to veto the application.51 Fortunately for Waukesha, none 
did—the Compact Council approved its application in June 2016,52 and the 
approval survived a subsequent legal challenge by the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative.53
These case studies serve as cautionary tales; without intervention, they may 
herald a looming threat for other parts of Wisconsin that depend on 
groundwater. Waukesha took advantage of an exception in the Great Lakes 
Compact to secure a more stable water supply, but other communities will 
certainly not be so fortunate.
D. Climate Change and Water Resources
The onset of climate change will pose many challenges for water resources 
management.54 These may include climatic impacts such as droughts and 
floods, as well as corresponding impacts to agriculture and food security, public 
health impacts, and environmental impacts on ecosystems and species.55 A
49. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Waukesha Plan for Lake Michigan Water Raises Worries, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/us/waukesha-plan-for-lake-michigan-
water-raises-worries.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F4LB-C6A2]. 
50. WIS. STAT. §§ 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(d), (4n)(d)(1), (2), (4). 
51. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(g) (“Council approval shall be given unless one or more 
council members vote to disapprove.”). 
52. Application by the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin for a Diversion of Great Lakes Water 
from Lake Michigan and an Exception to Allow the Diversion, No. 2016-1 (Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Res. Council June 21, 2016) (final decision) http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Doc
s/Waukesha/Waukesha—Final%20Decision%20of%20Compact%20Council%206-21-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6JQ3-7SE6]. 
53. See City of Waukesha, No. 2016-1 (Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Res. 
Compact Council May 4, 2017) (opinion) http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Docs/Waukesha/Compac 
t%20Council%20Opinion%20on%20GLSLCI%20Request%20for%20Hearing%205-4-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC52-TZUD]. The Cities Initiative generally argued that the public input process 
was inadequate and that Waukesha had a “reasonable water supply alternative” that could have avoided 
the need for the diversion. Id. It also repeatedly expressed a concern that granting Waukesha’s 
application would set a negative precedent authorizing future “straws in the lake.” Id.
54. See generally Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change 
World: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409 (2009); 
Dustin Charapata, Conference Report, Climate and Water Policy: When is the Right Time to Adjust 
Course?, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 425 (2011); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER
PROGRAM 2012 STRATEGY: RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2012).
55. Eckstein, supra note 54 at 415–16, 419–24. 
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detailed examination of these impacts is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Wisconsin will certainly not be immune. Impacts here will likely include 
increased flooding and degraded water quality.56 The University of 
Wisconsin’s Water Sustainability and Climate Project has simulated an 
innovative set of scenarios that explore how our region may respond to the 
potentially devastating impacts associated with climate change.57
II. EXISTING LEGAL REGIMES CANNOT MEET THESE CHALLENGES
The problems described in the previous section have the potential to 
devastate the Great Lakes and the population that relies on them. Yet existing 
federal and state laws and regulations are inadequate to respond, as described 
in the following sections. 
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Elephant That Fell Through the Cracks 
Nonpoint source pollution presents difficult regulatory challenges because 
of problems in identifying its origin and magnitude over time. Despite 
widespread recognition that it is the leading source of water quality 
impairments, current regulatory approaches have been almost completely 
unsuccessful in controlling water quality impacts from nonpoint sources.58
Multiple levels of government play a role in nonpoint source management. 
Traditionally, decisions about water allocation and management have been left 
to the states.59 By the early 1970s, however, the federal government took on 
an increasing role in pollution control. The bellwether of federal water 
protection laws, the Clean Water Act (“Act”), is intended to “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
56. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Climate Change Means for Wisconsin (Aug. 2016). This 
document has been removed from EPA’s current website but is temporarily available at 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/climate-change- 
wi.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4S7-ADYM] and is also on file with the author. 
57. See Univ. of Wis. Water Sustainability and Climate Project, Yahara 2070, WISC.EDU,
https://wsc.limnology.wisc.edu/yahara2070/about-yahara-2070 [https://perma.cc/4BUA-TDZA] (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2017). 
58. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 42, 85 (2014); Sonya Dewan, Emissions Trading: A Cost-Effective Approach to Reducing 
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 234 (2004). In contrast, the Clean 
Water Act has been very successful in reducing pollution from point sources. Warner, supra, at 85. 
59. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Comprehensive River Basin Management: The Limits of 
Collaborative, Stakeholder-Based, Water Governance, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 117 (2009) (citing 
a “tradition of federal deference to state responsibility for water allocation and management”); 
Alexandra Campbell-Ferrari, Managing Interstate Water Resources: Tarrant Regional and Beyond,
44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235–36 (2014) (“issues of water resources management have been left in the 
hands of states”). 
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waters,”60 and serves as the primary source of federal authority over water 
pollution.61 The core of the Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by 
any person” from any “point source” to navigable waters, except as authorized 
by permit.62 The precise meanings of these terms have provoked much 
litigation, but at issue here is the Clean Water Act’s regulation—or lack 
thereof—of nonpoint source pollution. 
The term “nonpoint source” is not defined in the Clean Water Act and has 
generally been taken to mean all sources other than point sources.63 Unlike 
point sources, nonpoint sources are not subject to the national permit system.64
Instead, the statute as initially drafted “leaves the regulation of nonpoint source 
pollution to the states.”65 For example, Section 208 directs the states to develop 
“areawide waste treatment management plans” to, among other things, 
Identify . . . agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources 
of pollution, including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and their 
cumulate effects, runoff from manure disposal areas, and from land used 
for livestock and crop production, and (ii) set forth procedures and 
methods (including land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible 
such sources.66
Courts have consistently interpreted the statute this way since its passage.67
After states largely failed to control nonpoint pollution, in 1987, Congress 
created a new section of the Clean Water Act intended to incentivize them to 
do so.68 Rather than taking a regulatory approach, as with point sources, 
Congress created a grant program that provides funds to states that develop and 
implement nonpoint source management programs. Specifically, Section 319 
60.     33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
61. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2005). 
62.     33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362(12). 
63. Robin Kundis Craig, Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas and Sovereign Immunity: 
Federal Facility Nonpoint Sources, the APA, and the Meaning of “In the Same Manner and to the 
Same Extent as any Nongovernmental Entity,” 30 Envtl. L. 527, 533 (2000) (“[N]onpoint sources are, 
by definition, not point sources” ). By contrast, the Clean Water Act defines “point source” to 
mean “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, 
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding 
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(14).
64. Cf. Final Decision, note 52, supra, and accompanying text (Act regulates “discharge of any 
pollutant by any person” from point sources to navigable waters) (emphasis added). 
65. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(7) (1987)). 
66.    33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(a), 1288(b)(2)(F). 
67.  Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 1976) (“Congress 
consciously distinguished between point source and nonpoint source discharges, giving EPA authority 
under the [Clean Water] Act to regulate only the former.”). 
68. See Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F.2d 1337, 1352–55 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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of the statute directs a state seeking federal funding to prepare assessment 
reports “identifying best management practices and measures to control each 
category and subcategory of nonpoint sources”69 and to prepare management 
programs “for controlling pollution added from nonpoint sources to the 
navigable waters within the State.”70 Between 1990 and 2016, the EPA 
awarded over $4.2 billion in aid under the program.71 Nevertheless, as noted 
above, nonpoint sources remain the leading cause of water impairment 
nationally.72
In pursuing its goal of fishable and swimmable waters,73 the Clean Water 
Act has been quite successful at addressing pollution from “point sources” such 
as pipes.74 By definition, nonpoint sources are outside that scope and are only 
loosely regulated by the Clean Water Act.75
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) similarly 
identifies nonpoint source pollution as “a leading cause of water quality 
problems in Wisconsin.”76 The state has developed and attempted to 
implement its Nonpoint Source Program Management Plan.77 As an example 
of its activities under that program, the DNR has set “Runoff Management” 
minimum standards of performance for agricultural and non-agricultural 
sites.78 But older Wisconsin farms are often subjected to such standards only 
when large cost-share percentage grants are available to fund compliance.79
Wisconsin’s approach to nonpoint source pollution “centers on statewide 
enforceable agricultural and non-agricultural performance standards and 
manure management prohibitions.”80 These standards consist of “minimum 
expectations” applied to a variety of land use practices in both agricultural and 
69.     33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(C). 
70.     33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1). 
71. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 Grant Program for States and Territories,
https://www.epa.gov/nps/319-grant-program-states-and-territories [https://perma.cc/NK7Z-55NY] 
(last updated Oct. 19, 2017). 
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
73. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (a goal of the Clean Water Act is to “provide[ ] for the 
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide[ ] for recreation in and on the 
water”).
74. Cf. Kronk, supra note 58, at 85. 
75. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (expressly excluding “agricultural stormwater discharges and 
return flows from irrigated agriculture” from the definition of a point source). 
76.   Wis. DNR, supra note 6; see also supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
77.  Wis. DNR, supra note 6. 
78.  WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151 (2017). 
79. See WIS. STAT. § 281.16(3)(e) (2015–2016); WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR 
151.09(4)(d), 151.09(5). 
80. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 9; see generally WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR. § NR 151 
(agricultural and non-agricultural performance standards). 
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developed areas.81 The DNR sets these standards but depends on the Wisconsin 
Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection to implement the 
program in conjunction with county officials.82 In interviews, DNR staff 
described this authority as robust.83 It includes numerous agricultural 
performance standards, including tillage setbacks,84 a maximum “phosphorus 
index,”85 process wastewater handling restrictions,86 maximum soil erosion 
rates,87 regulations for manure storage facilities,88 nutrient management 
planning requirements,89 and manure management standards and 
prohibitions.90 Non-agricultural standards also exist and include sediment 
discharge regulations applicable to construction sites91 and standards for 
developed urban areas.92
However, implementation of the standards remains a significant challenge, 
primarily due to lack of funding but also due to “insufficient staff levels, 
inadequate time and resources at both the state and county levels, and the lack 
of cost-share dollars for both hard (e.g. structural) and soft (e.g. management) 
practices.”93 Effective horizontal coordination between the two responsible 
state agencies, as well as effective vertical coordination between the agencies 
and the counties, has also proven difficult.94
In the end, nonpoint source pollution remains the leading source of water 
impairments in Wisconsin. Under the Act, each state is required to prepare a 
81. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 10. 
82. Id. at 8, 10 (“WDATCP establishes technical standards and other elements related to 
program implementation”). 
83. Telephone interview with with Brian Weigel (WDNR), Corrinne Johnson (WDNR), and 
Andrew Craig (WDNR) (May 8, 2017) (notes on file with author). 
84. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.03 (intended to “prevent tillage operations from 
destroying stream banks and depositing soil directly in surface waters”). 
85. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.04. The Phosphorus Index is an “agricultural land 
management planning tool for assessing the potential of a cropped or grazed field to contribute 
phosphorus to the surface water.”). Wis. Admin. Code § NR 151.015(15s). 
86. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.055 (prohibiting significant discharges of process 
wastewater to waters of the state). 
87. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.02 (maximum soil erosion rate should be less than or 
equal to the “‘tolerable’ (T) rate established for that soil.”). 
88. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.05 (establishing construction, alteration, and closure 
standards for new and existing facilities). 
89. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151.07(3) (manure, fertilizer, and other nutrients must be 
“applied in conformance with a nutrient management plan”). 
90. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR 151.07–151.08 (prohibiting manure overflows, 
unconfined piles, and direct runoff from stored manure into state waters). 
91. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR §§ NR 151.105–121. 
92. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DNR § NR 151, Subch. III-IV. 
93. Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 11. 
94. See id.
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list of waters not meeting current water quality standards.95 Wisconsin 
proposed 301 pollutant/water quality segment combinations for its 2014 list.96
Nonpoint source pollution is by far the leading cause—it is the dominant source 
of pollution for 43% of these listings and a source to another 15% of the 
impaired waters listed.97
Tensions caused by the intractable nature of the nonpoint source pollution 
problem boiled over in 2015. Frustrated with the failure of federal and Iowa 
state law to address nonpoint source pollution, one political subdivision of Iowa 
sued another.98 The Des Moines Water Works sued several upstream drainage 
districts, alleging state tort claims and federal and state statutory and 
constitutional claims.99 The Water Works “allege[d] that there has been an 
increased level of nitrates in [its] water supply caused by the drainage districts 
channeling of nitrate-contaminated ground water into the water supply.”100
Ultimately, the federal district court dismissed all claims against the drainage 
district after the Iowa Supreme Court, responding to questions certified by the 
district court, found that the drainage districts had unqualified immunity against 
the Water Works’ claims for damages and equitable remedies.101
Frustrated with the ruling, Des Moines Water Works CEO Bill Stowe 
issued a news release blaming “unregulated industrial agriculture” for 
“expensive, serious and escalating water pollution problems” in Central 
Iowa.102 Stowe also implored the Iowa Legislature to take action “addressing 
meaningful, long-term, sustainably funded policy solutions to our serious water 
problems.”103
B. Ineffective Controls on Invasive Species 
Federal and state laws, regulations, and policies have also proven largely 
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012). 
96.  Wis. DNR, supra note 6, at 24. 
97.  Id, at 24-25. The next leading cause is atmospheric deposition, which was the leading cause 
for about 19% of impairments. Point sources were the leading cause for almost none of the 
impairments. Id.
98.  Bd. of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. C 15-4020- 
LTS, 2017 WL 1042072, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 17, 2017). 
99.    Bd. of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines, 2017 WL 1042072, at *1. 
100.  Id. at *3. 
101. Id. at *1, *2. 
102. MacKenzie Elmer, Des Moines Water Works Won’t Appeal Lawsuit, DES MOINES
REGISTER (Apr. 11, 2017, 8:19 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2017/04/11/des-
moines-water-works-not-appeal-lawsuit/100321222/ [https://perma.cc/BGB7-2VGX]. 
103. Donnelle Eller, With Water Works’ Lawsuit Dismissed, Water Quality is the Legislature’s 
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inadequate to control the spread of invasive species, as discussed next. 
Almost twenty-five years ago, in 1993, the congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) found that “[t]he current Federal framework is 
a largely uncoordinated patchwork of laws, regulations, policies, and programs. 
Some focus on narrowly drawn problems. Many others peripherally address 
[invasive species]. In general, present Federal efforts only partially match the 
problems at hand.”104
The core problems identified in the OTA report remain unsolved today 
despite some small improvements in the federal government’s organizational 
response to invasive species prompted by then-President Clinton’s Executive 
Order 13,112.105 That Order generally imposed duties on federal agencies to 
prevent the introduction and establishment of invasive species106 but only to the 
extent “practicable”  and  “subject  to  the  availability  of  appropriations,  
and . . . budgetary limits.”107 In 2016, President Obama signed another 
Executive Order that continued federal efforts to control invasive species and 
incorporated considerations of climate change.108
Many of the invasive species threatening the Great Lakes originated in the 
ballast water holds of ocean going vessels.109 This is particularly true of zebra 
and quagga mussels.110 In an early response to this problem, and especially the 
spread of invasive mussels in the Great Lakes, Congress enacted the Non- 
Indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention Control Act (NANPCA).111
NANPCA regulates the release of ballast water carried to the United States 
from areas beyond the United States’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), meaning 
coastal waters extending beyond 200 miles of the United States coastline.112
104. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-F-565, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS
SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 163 (1993). 
105. For example, the Order created the National Invasive Species Council to oversee and 
implement the federal response to invasive species, among other duties. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 
Fed. Reg. 6183, 6184–85 (Feb. 3, 1999). 
106. Id. at 6184. 
107. Id.
108.    Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 90181 (Dec. 8, 2016) 
109. Nat’l RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., GREAT LAKES SHIPPING, TRADE,
AND AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES, at ix-x (2008); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 830-R-15-004, 
ANALYSIS OF BALLAST WATER DISCHARGES INTO THE GREAT LAKES FROM OVERSEAS VESSELS
FROM 2010 TO 2013 1 (2015) (ballast water is a “primary vector” for introduction of aquatic invasive 
species to the Great Lakes).
110. Nat’l Research Council, supra note 109, at ix. 
111. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701–4751 (2012). Congress stated that one purpose of NANPCA is to 
“prevent unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous species into waters of the United 
States through ballast water management and other requirements.” Id. § 4701(b)(1); see also 16 U.S.C. 
§ 4711(b)(2)(B)(iii); 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(3), 151.2035(b)(3) (2017). 
112. Id. §§ 4702(5), 4711(b)(2)(A). 
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NANPCA requires vessels carrying such water to choose one of three 
compliance options. First, such vessels may completely “exchange” such 
ballast water before entering the 200-mile EEZ.113 That exchange eliminates 
the invasive species from the ballast water either by discharging them into deep 
sea waters, or by increasing the salinity content of the ballast water to levels 
that cannot sustain life.114 Second, such vessels may retain the same ballast 
water during the entire time they are within the EEZ.115 Third, the vessels have 
the theoretical option to comply with other alternative methods approved by the 
Coast Guard.116
At the regulatory level, the EPA has also issued a Vessel General Permit 
(VGP) that regulates ballast water discharges pursuant to the Clean Water 
Act.117 Four environmental groups sued EPA over the VGP, claiming that it 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it selected the standards and 
requirements in the VGP.118 The court ultimately agreed and remanded some 
portions of the permit to EPA for reconsideration.119
These limited efforts have occasioned some—but not enough—positive 
results. In 2015, the EPA prepared a report analyzing ballast water discharges 
to the Great Lakes and concluded that ballast water flushing requirements are 
“estimated to be at least 95 percent effective” and have caused a decrease in the 
rate of new invasive species discoveries in the Great Lakes.120 But the measures 
have not been, and likely cannot be, completely effective, and much of the 
damage has already been done. 
The only other federal law particularly notable here is the Great Lakes Fish 
and Wildlife Restoration Act, which provides authority for the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission to “eradicate or minimize” invasive sea lamprey 
populations in the Great Lakes.121
113. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(i) ; 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(1), 151.2035(b)(1). 
114. Cory Hebert, Ballast Water Management: Federal, States, and International Regulations, 
37 S.U.L. REV. 315, 321 (2010). 
115. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(2), 151.2035(b)(2); accord 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
(vessels may discharge ballast in “other waters where the exchange does not pose a threat of infestation 
or spread of aquatic nuisance species in the Great Lakes and other waters of the United States”). 
116. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2012); 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1510(a)(3), 151.2025 (2017). 
117. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA HQ-OW-2011-0141-0949, NATIONAL POLLUTANT
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES) VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT FOR DISCHARGES
INCIDENTAL TO NORMAL OPERATION OF A VESSEL (VGP) (2013). The Second Circuit also 
summarized its provisions as part of the discussion in Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 808 F.3d 556, 564, 567-68 (2d Cir. 2015). 
118. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 569–70 (2d Cir. 2015). 
119. Id. at 571–84. 
120. U.S. EPA, supra note 109, at 2.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 941c(b)(3) (2012). Historically, this has been done by strategic applications 
of a “lampreycide” poison that controls, but does not eradicate, lamprey populations in the Great Lakes. 
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It is unlikely that the deficiencies in federal law will be remedied by state- 
based solutions, by the common law, or even by executive order. Many of the 
individual states, including Wisconsin, have enacted some invasive species 
control programs or measures.122 However, by their very nature, invasive 
species are unlikely to remain within a single state. This is especially true of 
water-based species, but even terrestrial species typically move about the 
country with little respect for political boundaries. 
C. Groundwater Overpumping 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources regulates groundwater 
withdrawals—and specifically high capacity wells— under Chapter 281 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.123 The agency also has general authority as the state’s 
designated “trustee” under the public trust doctrine.124 As described next, 
neither source of power is sufficient to address the overpumping described in 
Section I.C. of this Article. 
As an initial matter, one seeking to install a high capacity well must obtain 
approval from the Department before constructing the well.125 In certain 
special cases, the Department must conduct an environmental review of the 
well’s potential impacts.126 But most wells do not fall into those categories; 
and in such cases, the statute is silent regarding the scope of the Department’s 
authority to review the application or to impose conditions on the operation of 
the well. 
In those cases, the Department had historically relied on its general 
authority under the public trust doctrine127 to impose conditions as needed.128
As the name suggests, that doctrine is generally taken to mean that a state must 
act as “trustee” of certain natural resources, particularly the navigable waters 
of the state, and manage them for the trust beneficiaries—its people.129 It is 
See Egan, supra note 18, at 50–65 (describing the initial lamprey invasion, population boom, and 
eventual control and management). 
122. See, e.g., WI Dep’t of Natural Resources, Control Methods, http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/invas 
ives/control.html [https://perma.cc/E999-LJMH] (last updated Nov. 8, 2016). 
123. See Wis. Stat. § 281.34(2). 
124. See AKBA Ltd. P’ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶ 12, 648 N.W.2d 854; Borsellino v. 
DNR, 2000 WI App 27, ¶ 19, 606 N.W.2d 255. 
125.    Wis. Stat. § 281.34(2) (2015–16). 
126. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4) (extended review required with respect to wells in groundwater 
protection zones, wells for which more than 95% of the water withdrawn would be lost from the basin, 
and wells that could have a significant impact on a spring). 
127. ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. DNR, 648 N.W.2d 854 ¶ 12 (Wis. 2002). 
128. See Lake Beulah Mgmt. District v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶¶ 3–4, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799
N.W.2d 73.
129. The public trust doctrine can be traced back to ancient Roman law and the Institutes of 
Justinian. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1253 (2016) (doctrine’s “roots are in the 
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rooted in the state constitution,130 which itself borrowed heavily from the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.131
In 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expansively interpreted the public 
trust doctrine as a valid basis for DNR to consider whether to grant, 
conditionally grant, or deny a high capacity well permit based on the well’s 
impact on other waters of the state.132 In a remarkable turn of events, however, 
that decision may no longer be good law. 
In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), which 
requires explicit statutory or regulatory authority for actions taken by 
administrative agencies, including the imposition of permit conditions. In late 
2015, a Wisconsin trial court relied on § 227.10(2m) to prevent DNR from 
imposing certain conditions in a high-capacity well permit.133 And in a 2016 
opinion, Attorney General Brad Schimel concluded that “[t]hrough these 
changes to the law, [DNR’s] public trust duty . . . reverts back to the 
Legislature, which is responsible for making rules and statutes necessary to 
protect the waters of the state.”134 This interpretation could prevent DNR from 
imposing high capacity well permit conditions—or conceivably, from taking 
any action whatsoever based solely on the constitutionality—and common law- 
rooted public trust doctrine. 
All of this likely means that in cases where the statute is silent—as in all 
high capacity well applications other than the special exceptions noted above— 
the Department has no authority to impose conditions on the operation of high 
capacity wells.135
Institutes of Justinian, part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, the body of Roman law that is the ‘foundation 
for modern civil law systems.’”). In this country, the United States Supreme Court recognized it in the 
seminal 1892 decision Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
130. Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1 (“the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the 
Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways 
and forever free”). 
131. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, art. IV (“The navigable 
waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall 
be common highways, and forever free”). 
132. Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Wis. DNR, 799 N.W.2d 73 ¶¶ 3–5 (Wis. 2011). 
133. Decision and Order, New Chester Dairy v. DNR, Case No. 2014CV1055 (Outagamie 
County Cir. Ct. (Dec. 2, 2015). 
134. State of Wis. Dep’t of Justice, OAG-01-16, Opinion Letter on the Application of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) to the Issuance of High Capacity Groundwater Well Withdrawal Permits ¶ 53 (May 
10, 2016). 
135. See also 2017 Wisconsin Act 10 (signed June 1, 2017) (no additional Department 
approval is necessary for an existing high capacity well owner to repair, maintain, or reconstruct the 
well within a 75-foot radius of the existing well or to transfer it to a new owner as part of a land sale). 
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III. INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS
The final section of this Article begins to map out the theoretical 
underpinnings for alternative approaches to water quality using Professor 
Henry Smith’s theory of the “semicommons.” It also identifies possible 
innovative approaches to nonpoint source management, one of the problems 
discussed above. Similar development with respect to invasive species 
management and groundwater overpumping is left for future work. 
A. Extending Smith’s Theory of the Semicommons from Water Use Rights 
(Quantity) to Water Quality 
Professor Henry Smith has proposed that water and other “fluid resources,” 
such as intellectual property, “call for hybrid property systems combining 
private and common elements.”136 Smith calls this combination a 
“semicommons” and admits that it “require[s] much more fine-tuning through 
rules . . . than do more-familiar kinds of resources.”137
“[S]eparation between groups of uses is difficult,” Smith notes, when it 
comes to fluid resources.138 This leads to an important dilemma, because fluid 
resources are valuable for a variety of uses by a variety of users.139 This can 
lead to conflict when (as Smith notes) the uses are on different scales;140 or (we 
might add) when the uses are incompatible because one degrades the water’s 
purity to the point that it is unfit for the other’s use. To put this in Smith’s 
terms, “sometimes strategic behavior will allow shifting more than a 
proportionate cost to others and grabbing disproportionate benefits.”141
Smith analyzes two theoretical poles of property law to fluid resources: 
exclusion and governance.142 The solution, Smith writes, is to conceptualize 
fluid resources “to a regime of semicommons, in which different interacting 
uses are subject to different property regimes, some private and some 
common.”143 In the end, these public and private rights “interlock so tightly 
that it makes sense to see them as different versions of semicommons.”144
136. Henry E. Smith, Semicommons in Fluid Resources, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
195, 196 (2016). 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 197. 
139. Id. at 197–98. 
140. Id.
141. Id. at 198. 
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property 
Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 449 (2008) (“A semicommons exists where private and common 
property overlap and potentially interact.”). 
144. Smith, supra note 136, at 208. 
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While Smith’s work refers generally to the implications of the 
semicommons for “water law,”145 his analysis is primarily devoted to the 
allocation of private water rights—in other words, to water quantity. Yet in so 
many situations, that quantity is tightly related to water quality.146 It has long 
been recognized that “[a]ny separation between water quantity and water 
quality is artificial and stands in the way of solutions.”147 In Smith’s 
terminology, “the claim is that as the interactivity and importance of third-party 
effects become more important we will not only get more delineation effort but 
that it will take the form of more governance.”148 Of course, the same is true 
of water quality impacts caused by third parties. Smith also recognizes that 
certain public uses and public trust rights, such as navigation, may override 
private rights to use water.149
Given the close relationship between water quantity and water quality, it is 
worth investigating whether the “semicommons” should extend in some form 
to concerns over both elements. Recognized rights to use the resource on the 
one hand should lead to corresponding responsibilities on the other. Even prior 
to the advent of modern laws that protect water quality, courts had long held 
that where one riparian’s use of the water renders it unfit for use by another, 
the former is liable to the latter.150
B. Beyond Regulation: Other Innovative Proposals to Leverage the 
Semicommons
If one accepts the conclusions in this article that, first, Wisconsin waters 
145. Smith, supra note 143, at 450 (“The Nature of Water Law”); id. at 466 (“Water law tends 
to be viewed as either private property on the one hand or as a pure tort-like commons or a regulatory 
regime on the other.”). The reference to “water law” seems an oversimplification given that Smith 
refers here to private water rights rather than pollution control or other water quality concerns also 
germane to “water law.” 
146. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994) 
(finding that reduction of the volume of a water body could destroy its quality and even constitute 
“water pollution” under the Clean Water Act). Id.
147. Anne W. Squier, Water Quality Under Western Water Law, 21 ENVTL. L. 1081, 1083 
(1991); see also Reed Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under Clean 
Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 204 (2005) (“water quantity can significantly affect 
water quality”); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Can the Clean Water Act Succeed as an Ecosystem 
Protection Law?, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 46, 62 (2013) (water quality and water 
quantity are “intimately and unavoidably linked”). 
148. Smith, supra note 136, at 456. 
149. Id. at 470 (citing “public trust uses”). In Wisconsin and many other states, the public trust 
doctrine also protects uses tightly related to water quality, such as fishing, recreation, and scenic 
beauty. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. DNR, 833 N.W.2d 800 ¶¶ 87–88 (Wis. 2013). 
150. See, e.g., H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 100 S.W. 116, 117–18, 122 (Tenn. 1907) 
(holding that “[a]ny use of . . . the water of a stream itself, which renders the water unwholesome, 
offensive, or unfit for the purposes for which it is used, is unlawful.”). 
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face a variety of serious threats; that, second, existing laws and regulations are 
not sufficient to control these threats;151 and that, third, the theory of the 
semicommons implies both public and private rights and responsibilities with 
respect to water quality, then the question becomes: What is to be done? New 
or strengthened environmental regulations seem improbable in the current 
political climate.152
One potential path for Wisconsin, in the face of retreating federal and 
state involvement, is a greater role for local or private efforts to improve water 
quality. Indeed, private water users should feel a moral obligation to maintain 
or even improve water quality in light of their rights to use water under 
Wisconsin’s system of “reasonable use.”153
Increased private engagement in water quality efforts face substantial 
hurdles. At a minimum, private entities must be convinced of the “business 
case” to become involved. This first assumes that historical antipathy of private 
firms and individuals toward environmental protection154 can be overcome. 
This issue is complex. Theoretically, several considerations might convince 
private firms and individuals to embrace voluntary participation in 
environmental protection. Properly designed and executed voluntary initiatives 
can “cut costs, increase market share and create new market opportunities.”155
For example, in the context of sustainable agriculture leading to improved water 
quality, the benefits could include improved profitability due to efficient 
fertilizer management; increased confidence in grower decision-making as a 
result of advanced data collection and management efforts; marketing 
advantages given the sustainability demands increasingly imposed by retailers 
upon suppliers; and even improved reputation among supply chain partners and 
with consumers.156 Some optimistic estimates suggest that industry actually 
prefers to self-adopt voluntary environmental conservation initiatives to 
forestall environmental problems that would trigger the onset of mandatory 
151. Accord ROBERT KERR ET AL., BEYOND REGULATION: EXPORTERS AND VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES, at ix (1998) (citing a “growing realization . . . that traditional regulatory 
tools alone are not adequate”). 
152. But see David A. Strifling, The Microbead-Free Waters Act of 2015: Model for Future 
Environmental Legislation, or Black Swan?, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 151, 159–61 (2015) 
(suggesting strategies for advocates of future environmental legislation). 
153. Hocking v. Dodgeville, 768 N.W.2d 552 ¶¶ 14, 18 (describing “reasonable use” doctrine). 
154. Accord Laura A. Cisneros, Environmental Resistance: Defying Capitalism’s Structure of 
False Rebellion, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 7 (2015) (arguing that “environmental protection 
and capitalism are inherently oppositional” and generate “antipathies so fundamental that they make 
current environmental protection laws inadequate”). 
155. Kerr, supra note 151, at xi. 
156. See Suzy Friedman, Beyond Regulation: Making the Business Case For Sustainable 
Farming (Jan. 7, 2015), http://blogs.edf.org/growingreturns/2015/01/07/beyond-regulation-making-
the-business-case-for-sustainable-farming/ [https://perma.cc/LRZ9-V7GB]. 
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regulations.157
However, other recent studies have shown that the voluntary adoption rate 
of nutrient reduction technologies to improve water quality is relatively low, 
even when substantial incentives are provided to do so.158 Sampled farmers 
had an unrealistically high perception of existing water quality and, 
unsurprisingly, strongly opposed penalties for noncompliance with 
environmental regulations.159
Safeguards would be necessary to mitigate the risk of private involvement 
with public trust resources. For example, strong objections have been raised to 
direct ownership of public water utilities by for-profit entities.160
Environmental groups often strongly oppose even voluntary initiatives for 
environmental protection, preferring the security of mandatory regulations and 
enforcement efforts.161 Depending on the structure, public-private partnerships 
are hailed in some quarters162 and disparaged in others.163 In any such 
arrangement, the level of built-in safeguards to protect public safety is highly 
variable from state to state.164
Assuming those hurdles are cleared, innovative public-private partnership 
efforts to control nonpoint source pollution could shape up in the following 
ways. 
157. Id.
158. Florence G. Gachango et al., Adoption of Voluntary Water-Pollution Reduction 
Technologies and Water Quality Perception Among Danish Farmers, 158 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 235, 
235 (2015). 
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, Water Privatization: Facts and Figures (Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/water-privatization-facts-and-figures 
[https://perma.cc/BT7Y-4CTR] (“privatizing local water and sewer systems usually does farm more 
harm than good for our communities”). 
161. James Q. Lynch, Water Quality Advocates Say Voluntary Actions Not Working, THE
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2016 2:01 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/business/agriculture/wa
ter-quality-advocates-say-voluntary-actions-not-working-20161117 [https://perma.cc/2XKA-CTP7] 
(environmental advocates call for “farmland regulation” instead of voluntary pollutant reduction 
strategies); see also Kerr, supra note 151, at xi. 
162. Michael Della Rocca, The Rising Advantage of Public-Private Partnerships, MCKINSEY
& CO. (July 2017) https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-
insights/the-rising-advantage-of-public-private-partnerships [https://perma.cc/W4CF-CTLH]. 
163. See, e.g., Food and Water Watch, supra note 136; David Hall, Why Public-Private 
Partnerships Don’t Work, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (Feb. 2015) 
http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/rapport_eng_56pages_a4_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE8Q- 
F622].
164. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: 
Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM.& MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV.
785, 792–93 (2009). 
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1. “Sponge Cities” 
In an era of decreasing federal and state involvement,165 local
environmental conservation efforts take on increased importance. In the 
context of nonpoint source pollution, this can take the form of “green 
infrastructure”166 and other devices to improve water quality. 
This movement can take new inspiration from a (perhaps) unlikely source: 
China.167 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a plan to transform 
Chinese cities into “sponges.”168 These “sponge cities” are designed to retain 
stormwater in a variety of ways, purifying it as it moves through “green 
infrastructure” and soil, and ultimately storing it as groundwater for re-use.169
This process allows the city to regenerate and expand its own water supply 
while simultaneously reducing the burden on traditional infrastructure, such as 
wastewater treatment facilities. In 2015, the Chinese government released 
detailed guidance “on [a]dvancing the [c]onstruction of [s]ponge [c]ities” 
directing that 70% of urban rainfall will be captured and re-used.170 China now 
165. See, e.g., Evan Lehmann & Emily Holden, Trump Budget Cuts Funds for EPA by 31 
Percent, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Mar. 16, 2017) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump- 
budget-cuts-funds-for-epa-by-31-percent/ [https://perma.cc/56VW-J4RQ]; Associated Press, 
Wisconsin DNR Sees Job Cuts, Slashed Budget (Jan. 15, 2017 11:53 AM) 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/01/15/wisconsin-dnr-job-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/3XSH-CK3F]; 
Siri Carpenter, How Scott Walker Dismantled Wisconsin’s Environmental Legacy, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (June 17, 2015) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-scott-walker- 
dismantled-wisconsin-s-environmental-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/VM5L-KAF5]. 
166. Green Infrastructure refers to a variety of “mechanisms that mimic, maintain, or restore 
natural hydrological features in the urban landscape.” Caswell F. Holloway et al., Solving the CSO 
Conundrum: Green Infrastructure and the Unfulfilled Promise of Federal-Municipal Cooperation, 38 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335, 335 (2014). See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green
Infrastructure, EPA.GOV (Oct. 20, 2017) https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/ 
N4C9-WVQK]. 
167. See Robert V. Percival, China’s “Green Leap Forward” Toward Global Environmental 
Leadership, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 633, 633–34 (2011) (noting that China’s historical policies have been 
described as a “War Against Nature” but that “there are signs of a dramatic improvement in 
environmental consciousness in China in recent years”). 
168. James Workman, Sponge Cities: Can China’s Model Go Global?, THE SOURCE (July 13, 
2017), https://www.thesourcemagazine.org/sponge-cities-can-chinas-model-go-global/ [https://perma 
.cc/6NNQ-KB2S].
169. Tools for “sponge cities” include bioswales, green roofs, retention ponds, and porous 
pavements, among other things. Working together, these measures, when combined with others, can 
reduce runoff from sponge cities by eighty-five percent. Id.
170. General Office of the State Council, Guiding Opinions of the General Office of the State 
Council on Advancing the Construction of Sponge Cities, effective November 10, 2015. Translated 
versions of the guidance are not freely available, but rough Internet translations show a well-formed 
policy that both defines sponge city management, establishes the 70% requirement, and sets out basic 




qi_22-1 Sheet No. 76 Side B      05/20/2019   14:43:36
40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 76 Side B      05/20/2019   14:43:36
C M
Y K
9. STRIFLING.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2018 1:52 PM 
148 MARQ. INTELL.PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 22:1 
boasts more than thirty such “sponge cities.”171
2. Voluntary Programs and Initiatives 
Voluntary programs to address environmental problems are nothing new. 
In fact, “[e]nvironmental externalities emanating from agricultural production 
have traditionally been dealt with in the United States through voluntary 
approaches.”172 No doubt, however, there is room for improvement; as noted 
above, these measures “have largely failed to improve water quality” in 
impaired waters.173 Recent studies have shown that performance-based 
approaches (measuring the ultimate performance of the measure) are more 
efficient than approaches that specify adoption of a particular technology.174
However, performance-based policies “are difficult to implement for nonpoint 
source pollution because pollutant discharge cannot easily be measured and 
regulators lack the information necessary to set optimal performance goals.”175
Program leaders therefore often focus instead on inputs and management 
practices, known as design-based approaches.176
Some Midwestern states already have voluntary programs for nonpoint 
source  control. Minnesota’s “Agricultural Water Quality Certification 
Program” allows farmers to voluntarily implement certain conservation 
practices in exchange for “regulatory certainty” for a period of ten years, along 
with marketing status advantages and priority for technical and financial 
assistance.177 Farmers who decide to take part in the program must verify 
compliance with existing federal and state water quality laws and rules, 
including the Clean Water Act.178 Field verification by program staff then 
“establishes that the practices and commitments of certified producers are 
accurate and that there are no additional resource concerns to be addressed.”179
In Iowa, the state’s “Nutrient Reduction Strategy” aims to reduce by 45% 
3Dbig5&prev=search [https://perma.cc/3D77-2MNA].
171. Workman, supra note 168. 
172. Jeff Savage & Marc Ribaudo, Improving the Efficiency of Voluntary Water Quality 
Conservation Programs, 92 LAND ECON. 148, 148 (2016). This is in stark contrast to externalities 
derived from industrial “end-of-pipe” sources, dealt with by regulations issued under the authority of 
the Clean Water Act. Id.
173. Id.
174. See generally id.
175. Id. at 155. 
176. Id.
177.    Minn. Stat. § 17.9891–17.9993 (2017). 
178. MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM 6 (Jan. 30, 2015). 
179. Id. at 7. 
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the load of phosphorus and nitrogen to the Gulf of Mexico.180 The Strategy 
calls for “[a] concerted, cooperative and sustained effort by both point and 
nonpoint sources” to meet this goal.181 Specifically, the Strategy involves 
watershed prioritization and will employ a combination of on- and off-field 
practices and pilot projects.182 As part of the strategy, Iowa launched the 
Farmer Recognition Program to increase public recognition of participating 
farmers, along with a statewide education and marketing campaign.183 The
Strategy is somewhat light on details of progress-measuring metrics, stating 
only that Iowa will “develop new and expanded frameworks to track progress, 
beyond the traditional ambient water quality monitoring networks.”184
Advocates describe these voluntary measures as flexible and effective, 
especially as compared to the “blunt instrument[s]” embodied in mandatory 
regulations that are “lock[ed] . . . in time” and “stifle . . . creativity.”185
Moreover, they can often be implemented quickly as compared to traditional 
regulations, which often take years to draft and implement and are often bogged 
down by lengthy legal challenges. 
Other proposals for more indirect private involvement could include 
increased support for grant programs or public educational campaigns. 
CONCLUSION
As it moves forward in the twenty-first century, Wisconsin faces many 
threats to a resource at the core of its identity—its abundant fresh water. One 
thing is clear, traditional “command and control” regulatory approaches, 
standing alone, are not likely to suffice. Instead, overcoming these challenges 
will require innovative approaches that are just beginning to emerge. 
180. IOWA DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND LAND STEWARDSHIP ET AL., IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION
STRATEGY:A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-BASED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS AND REDUCE NUTRIENTS
TO IOWA WATERS AND THE GULF OF MEXICO 1 (Sept. 2016). 
181. Id. at 2. 
182. Id. at 21. 
183. Id. at 22. 
184. Id. at 24. 
185. Dirck Steimel, Northey: Voluntary Water Quality Effort Far Superior to Regulation (Feb.
2, 2015) IOWA FARM BUREAU https://www.iowafarmbureau.com/Article/Northey-Voluntary-water- 
quality-effort-far-superior-to-regulation [https://perma.cc/BDW2-WZEH] (quoting Iowa Agriculture 
Secretary Bill Northey). 
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